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APPLYING THE COMMON-LAW CAUSE OF ACTION
NEGLIGENT ENABLEMENT OF IMPOSTER FRAUD TO
SOCIAL NETWORKING SITES
Shannon N. Sterritt ∗
But he that filches from me my good name/Robs me of that
1
which not enriches him/And makes me poor indeed.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Social networking sites, such as MySpace, Twitter, Facebook, and
LinkedIn, are popping up all over the Internet and establishing social
media as the fastest-growing phenomenon yet. While radio took thirty-eight years to reach fifty million users and television took thirteen
2
years, the Internet took only four years. Social networking sites,
however, quickly surpassed these records. Facebook reached over fifty million users within thirteen months of allowing access to anyone
3
with a valid email address. Today, while continuing to grow at a rap4
id pace, Facebook has more than 750 million users. LinkedIn, a professional social networking site, reached thirty-six million members in
March 2009 and is adding members at a rate of one member per
5
second.
∗
J.D., 2011, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2008, University of Maryland—College Park. I would like to thank Professor Ronald J. Riccio and Seth Fersko
for all of their help and guidance throughout this process and my parents for their
continuous love and support.
1
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO act 3, sc. 3.
2
United Nations, Information and Communications Technology, UN
CYBERSCHOOLBUS
1,
http://www.un.org/cyberschoolbus/briefing/technology/tech.pdf (last visited Aug.
14, 2011).
3
Timeline,
FACEBOOK,
http://www.facebook.com/home.php?ref=home#!
/press/info.php?timeline (last visited Aug.14, 2011).
4
Statistics,
FACEBOOK,
http://www.facebook.com/facebook?ref=pf#/press/
info.php?statistics (last visited Aug. 14 2011).
5
Abbey Klaassen, LinkedIn Skyrockets as Job Losses Mount, ADVER. AGE (Mar. 2,
2009), http://adage.com/digital/article?article_id=134962; see also About Us,
LINKEDIN, http://press.linkedin.com/about (last visited Aug. 14, 2011) (“As of June
30, 2011 (the end of the second quarter), professionals are signing up to join LinkedIn at a rate that is faster than two new members per second. . . . As of August 4,

1695

STERRITT_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1696

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

11/7/2011 1:47 PM

[Vol. 41:1695

Social networking sites provide benefits for users of all ages and
backgrounds. Social networking sites allow users the ability to recon6
nect with old friends and make new friends. These websites offer users an open forum for public debate on just about any topic imagina7
ble, which encourages freedom of speech and expression. In addiaddition, most social networking sites are “global,” which provides for
8
diverse relationships. Social networking sites are highly effective in
9
the world of advertising and sales. These websites offer traditional
Internet advertising options in addition to “fan pages” and “groups,”
10
which provide an interactive way to target consumers.
Websites
created for professional networking and employment searching, such
11
as LinkedIn, also exist within the social networking realm. Studies
show that social networking sites also provide educational and deve12
lopmental benefits to younger users.
While the growth of these websites is indicative of their many
benefits, these websites are becoming a dangerous tool. In recent
years, stories of crimes facilitated by the use of social networking sites
dominated the news. Stories range from Lori Drew, who used MyS13
pace to “cyberbully” her daughter’s thirteen year-old rival, to the

2011, LinkedIn operates the world’s largest professional network on the Internet
with more than 120 million members in over 200 countries and territories.”).
6
See Karen Goldberg Goff, Social Networking Benefits Validated, WASH. TIMES (Jan.
28, 2009, 5:45 AM), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/jan/28/socialnetworking-benefits-validated/.
7
See WHAT IS SOC. NETWORKING, http://www.whatissocialnetworking.com/ (last
visited Aug. 14, 2011).
8
See id.
9
See Jean Halliday, Honda’s ‘Social Experiment’ Nets More than 100,000 Facebook
Fans, ADVER. AGE (Oct. 22, 2009), http://adage.com/article?article_id=139855 (discussing Honda’s success in recruiting fans to the brand’s Facebook page entitled
“Everybody Knows Somebody Who Loves a Honda”).
10
Id.
11
See About Us, LINKEDIN, http://press.linkedin.com/about/ (last visited Aug. 14,
2011).
12
See, e.g., Mizuko Ito et al., The MacArthur Foundation Reports on Digital Media and
Learning; Living and Learning with New Media: Summary of Findings from the Digital Youth
Project,
MACARTHUR
FOUND.,
(Nov.
2008),
http://digitalyouth.ischool.berkeley.edu/files/report/digitalyouthTwoPageSummary.pdf; Educational Benefits of Social Networking Sites Uncovered, SCI.
DAILY
(June
21,
2008),
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2008/06/080620133907.htm.
13
Jennifer LeClaire, MySpace Mom Indicted in Cyber-Bully Suicide Case, SCI-TECH
TODAY (May 18, 2009), http://www.sci-tech-today.com/news/MySpace-MomCharged-in-Teen-Death/story.xhtml?story_id=10300CL7QBNV (discussing the indictment of Lori Drew who created a fake MySpace profile to bully her daughter’s
rival, who committed suicide as a result).
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Craigslist murders and sexual assaults. In addition to these crimes,
instances of identity theft have escalated as social networking sites
16
have become more popular. A recent Gallup Crime Survey indicated that identity theft provokes greater concern among Americans
than any other crime, with two in three adults worried about falling
17
victim to identity theft.
Identity theft through the use of social networking sites can occur in two different ways: (1) an imposter can gather an individual’s
personal information, such as name, address, and phone number,
from an existing social networking profile and then use it to obtain
credit or gain employment in the victim’s name, as well as gain access
to already established accounts, or (2) an imposter can use another’s
information to create a false profile on a social networking site, which
can then result in harm to one’s reputation and possibly one’s financial and criminal record. In addition, this latter form of identity theft
through social networking sites can lead to other crimes facilitated
through the Internet.
Although all of the problems associated with social networking
sites are important and deserve lengthy discussion on what the law
can do to solve or minimize the effects of these problems, this Comment will focus on the second scenario, that is, when an identity thief
uses an individual’s information to create a fake profile. Although
some imposters might create these fake profiles out of jest, the result

14
Med Student Arrested In Craigslist Murder, CBS NEWS (Apr. 20, 2009)
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/04/20/national/main4958272.shtml (detailing an arrest made in the murder of a Boston woman who advertised services on
Craigslist)
15
See, e.g., Shannon Powell, Craigslist Ad Leads to Sexual Assault, KXAN.COM (June
11,
2009),
http://www.kxan.com/dpp/news/crime/Craigslist_ad_leads_to_sexual_assault (discussing the sexual assault of an Austin woman who had arranged to meet the perpetrator through Craigslist).
16
“Social networking sites like Facebook and Twitter are the new frontier in the
identity theft battle because of their astounding growth rates.” Tom Ahearn, Users of
Popular Social Networking Sites Facebook and Twitter Warned About Identity Theft, MY
BACKGROUND
CHECK
BLOG
(Oct.
21,
2009,
11:16
AM),
http://www.mybackgroundcheck.com/blog/post/2009/10/21/Users-of-PopularSocial-Networking-Sites-Facebook-and-Twitter-Warned-About-Identity-Theft.aspx.
17
Lydia Saad, Two in Three Americans Worry About Identity Theft, GALLUP (Oct. 16,
2009), http://www.gallup.com/poll/123713/Two-in-Three-Americans-Worry-AboutIdentity-Theft.aspx. The Poll showed that sixty-six percent of adults in the United
States worry frequently or occasionally about identity theft. Id. The second biggest
concern was a car brake-in or a car theft, which worried forty-seven percent of Americans. Id.
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of such jokes causes serious harm to their victims. Of more concern,
however, are those criminal imposters who create fake profiles with
the intent to harm their victims.
This form of imposter fraud is a growing issue for celebrities,
who have frequently discovered profiles on social networking sites
that they did not create. In 2007, Prince William had a fake Face19
book profile of “William Wales” removed from the site. Earlier that
year, Sarah Palin sent a message through her Twitter account “AKGovSarahPalin” apologizing for false information coming from an
20
imposter behind the fake Twitter account “EXGovSarahPalin.” The
manager of the St. Louis Cardinals, Tony LaRussa, had a fake Twitter
account taken down when the perpetrator posted “derogatory and
demeaning” messages about his DUI charge and the death of two
21
Cardinals players. And more recently, imposters created fake MySpace and Facebook profiles in the names of Penguins’ players Sidney
Crosby and Evgeni Malkin to solicit money from the public for the
22
stated, but false, purpose of benefiting a Minneapolis park.
The imposter problem, however, extends beyond the world of
the famous and affects the average person, who most likely does not
have the resources or clout to fix the problem before serious harm
results. In Oregon, Cynthia Barnes’s ex-boyfriend created a fake Yahoo profile in her name, which included her address, phone num23
ber, and nude photographs of her. In San Antonio, Texas, high
school students created a fake MySpace profile of the assistant principal containing false information about her sexual orientation and
24
practices, as well as obscene comments and content. The numerous
examples of imposter profiles surfacing on social networking sites
25
show the prevalence of the problem and the potential harm.

18
David Wood, No Easy Remedy for Imposter Postings on Social Networking Sites,
CONSUMER
AFF.
(Mar.
17,
2008),
http://www.consumeraffairs.com/news04/2008/03/myspace_impostors.html.
19
Jason Cato, Great Fake Out: Cyber-Posers Make Life Tough for Celebs, PITTSBURGH
TRIB. REV. (July 16, 2009) (on file with author).
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Wendy Davis, Texas Lawmakers Crackdown on Fake Profiles, MEDIA POST NEWS
(June
8,
2009),
http://www.mediapost.com/publications/?fa=Articles.
showArticle&art_aid=107518.
24
Chris Gatewood, Fake User Profiles: Free Speech or Defamation, SITEPOINT (Nov. 7,
2008), http://articles.sitepoint.com/article/fake-social-networking-profiles.
25
See Wood, supra note 18 (describing cases of imposter fraud on social networking sites).
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The common-law tort of negligent enablement of imposter
fraud, however, may be the solution to this growing problem. Negligent enablement of imposter fraud has traditionally (but sparingly)
26
been used in the context of financial institutions; however, this
cause of action is still viable in the social networking site context.
This Comment argues that a third party can hold social networking
sites liable for their failure to prevent imposter fraud from occurring
through the cause of action of negligent enablement of imposter
fraud. Although the Communications Decency Act’s (CDA or “the
Act”) immunity provision has been a traditional bar to most lawsuits
against social networking sites, recent reinterpretations suggest a narrower reading of the immunity statute, which would allow for claims
27
in the instance of imposter fraud.
In the alternative, Congress
should amend the Act, explicitly allowing for the prevention of imposter fraud.
This Comment argues that social networking sites are at risk for
liability under negligent enablement of imposter fraud because they
owe a duty to the public-at-large to attempt to prevent imposter
fraud. A social networking site’s failure to impose reasonable procedures is therefore a breach of that duty. Expanding the tort of negligent enablement of imposter fraud into the realm of social networking sites will give victims of imposter fraud a remedy and force these
sites to put reasonable verification standards in place, ultimately decreasing the prevalence of identity theft on these sites.
Part II of this Comment explores how social networking sites
function and how the law has defined identity theft. Part II further
details the existing legislation governing social networking sites. In
addition, Part II also looks at the current legislation addressing identity theft and the ineffectiveness in providing relief to victims of imposter fraud on social networking sites. Part III proposes expanding
the common-law tort of negligent enablement of imposter fraud as a
solution to this problem. Part III shows how the CDA is no longer a
bar to such a cause of action, and how plaintiffs could succeed on
their claims.
II. BACKGROUND
Social networking sites dominate the current age with a majority
of individuals having at least one social networking account. With
this craze, however, came an increase in identity theft of all forms.
26
27

See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part II.C.
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Although there are federal and state statues criminalizing identity
theft and attempting to curb its prevalence, unfortunately, imposter
fraud on social networking sites presents a whole set of problems that
are not regulated by the current statutes.
A. Social Networking Sites: New Age Means of Communication
Social networking sites, such as MySpace, Facebook, and Twitter,
dominate the Internet and have forever changed the way people interact and communicate. The features offered on social networking
sites vary from site to site; however, most sites center on the idea of a
user-maintained profile that is linked to other users of the site
28
through communities and networks. As the court in Doe v. MySpace,
Inc. explained,
[S]ocial networking web site[s] . . . allow[] [their] members to
create online “‘profiles,”‘ which are individual web pages on
which members post photographs, videos, and information about
their lives and interests. The idea of online social networking is
that members will use their online profiles to become part of an
online community of people with common interests. Once a
member has created a profile, she can extend “‘friend invitations”
‘to other members and communicate with her friends . . . via e29
mail, instant messaging, or blogs.

Social networking sites are a fun, interactive form of communi30
cation and provide entertainment for users of all ages and interests.
In addition, social networking sites provide networking benefits, both
personal and professional. The use of “groups,” “fan pages,” and
other similar features provide mechanisms to locate users with common interests. In addition, some social networking sites provide a fo-

28

Richard M. Guo, Note, Stranger Danger and the Online Social Network, 23
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 617, 619–20 (2008). Communities and networks are akin to
“small rural communities or neighborhood subdivisions.”
WHAT IS SOC.
NETWORKING, http://www.whatissocialnetworking.com/ (last visited Aug. 14, 2011).
29
474 F. Supp. 2d 843, 845–46 (W.D. Tex. 2007).
30
Facebook’s user population is made up of forty-two percent ages eighteen to
thirty-four, twenty-two percent ages thirteen to seventeen, twenty percent ages thirtyfive to forty-nine, twelve percent ages fifty and over, and four percent ages three to
twelve. QUANTCAST, http://www.quantcast.com/ (then type Facebook or MySpace to
generate current demographic results) (last visited Aug. 14, 2011). MySpace generates roughly the same demographic proportions. Id. Women aged fifty-five or older
are the fastest growing group of users on Facebook. Justin Smith, Fastest Growing Demographic on Facebook: Women Over 55, INSIDE FACEBOOK (Feb. 2, 2009),
http://www.insidefacebook.com/2009/02/02/fastest-growing-demographic-onfacebook-women-over-55/.
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rum specifically for professional networking. A recent survey regarding job recruitment indicated that eighty percent of employers
32
use or plan to use social networking sites to find employees.
The most popular social networking sites are Facebook, MySpace
33
Twitter, and LinkedIn. “Unique visitors” refers to the number of
individual people who have visited a particular site one or more times
34
within a designated time period. As of October 1, 2011, Facebook
has approximately 700,000,000 unique visitors per month, while
35
MySpace has 80,500,000 unique visitors.
Twitter and LinkedIn,
more recent sites, have quickly jumped in the rankings with
200,000,000 and 100,000,000 unique visitors per month, respective36
ly. Although many social networking sites exist, this Comment will
focus on MySpace and Facebook, two of the oldest and most popular
social networking sites.
1.

MySpace
37

MySpace began the social networking craze in 2003. Over the
years, MySpace made improvements and additions to the site, but the
basic format has remained the same. Individuals join MySpace by en38
tering a name, date of birth, gender, and valid email address. After
registering, members enter their personal information on topics
ranging from “About Me” and “Who I’d Like to Meet,” to more specific topics, such as an individual’s schools, companies, marital status,

31

See, e.g., About Us, LINKEDIN, http://press.linkedin.com/about (last visited Aug.
14, 2011).
32
Jobvite Survey Reveals Untapped Potential in Social Networks, JOBVITE (May 13,
2008),
http://recruiting.jobvite.com/news/press-releases/pr/social-recruitmentsurvey-release.php. The survey indicates that employers are recruiting more heavily
through social networking sites. Id.
33
Top 15 Most Popular Social Networking Sites, October 2011, EBIZMBA (Oct. 1
2011), http://www.ebizmba.com/articles/social-networking-websites [hereinafter
Top Networking Sites].
34
Jason Bubury et al., Web Analytics Definitions—Version 4.0, WEB ANALYTICS ASS’N,
9
(Aug.
16,
2007),
http://www.webanalyticsassociation.org/
resource/resmgr/PDF_standards/WebAnalyticsDefinitionsVol1.pdf.
35
Top Networking Sites, supra note 33.
36
Id.
37
A
History
of
MySpace,
RANDOMHISTORY.COM
(Aug.
14,
2008),
http://www.randomhistory.com/2008/08/14_myspace.html (discussing MySpace as
similar to the already existing social networking site, Friendster); see also Guo supra
note 28, at 621.
38
Sign up for MySpace, MYSPACE, http://signups.myspace.com/index.cfm?
fuseaction=signup (last visited Mar. 15, 2011).
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39

hometown, and personal preferences. MySpace members interact
40
by sending messages and “friending” each other. Members can update their profiles to reflect what they are doing and their current
41
mood, as well as post favorite videos, photos, and music playlists.
MySpace has a strong focus on the entertainment world and is a pop42
ular spot for musicians to showcase their music. In addition, News
Corp., MySpace’s previous parent company, “helped create MySpace
43
Music,” a joint venture with four recording agencies.
With attempts to create a safe networking space, MySpace established terms and conditions, applicable to all users, prohibiting illegal
conduct. MySpace’s Terms and Conditions provide for the following:
By using the MySpace Services, you represent and warrant that (a)
all registration information you submit is truthful and accurate;
(b) you will maintain the accuracy of such information; (c) you
are 13 years of age or older; and (d) your use of the MySpace Ser44
vices does not violate any Applicable Law.

The Terms and Conditions also prohibit criminal and tortious activity, such as “child pornography, fraud, trafficking in obscene material,
drug dealing, gambling, harassment, defamation, stalking, spamming, spimming, sending of viruses or other harmful files, copyright
45
infringement, patent infringement, or theft of trade secrets.” Despite these terms, detecting user violations is difficult.
The age of MySpace members varies, ranging from fourteen
years old to sixty-five and over; however, trends show MySpace is
46
more popular among younger users. In 2006, MySpace expanded
39

Profile Edit, MYSPACE, http://home.myspace.com (username and password required) (last visited Feb. 13, 2011).
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Greg Sandoval, MySpace to Push Deeper into Entertainment, CNET NEWS (July 10,
2009), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-10284593-93.html.
43
Id. MySpace was sold in June of 2011 to Specific Media and Justin Timberlake.
Andy Fixmer, News Corp. Calls Quits on MySpace With Specific Media Sale, BUSINESSWEEK
(June 29, 2011 9:59 PM), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-06-29/newscorp-calls-quits-on-myspace-with-specific-media-sale.html.
44
Myspace.com Terms of Use Agreement, MYSPACE (June 25, 2009),
http://www.myspace.com/help/terms.
45
Id.
46
Matt Dickman, The Age of Facebook v. MySpace: February/March Edition, TECHNOMARTKETER
(Mar.
10,
2009,
10:38
PM),
http://technomarketer.typepad.com/technomarketer/2009/03/the-age-offacebook-vs-myspace-februarymarch-edition.html; Manoj Jasra, Age Differences Between
MySpace and Facebook Users, WEBPRONEWS (Feb. 10, 2010, 3:25PM),
http://www.webpronews.com/age-differences-between-myspace-and-facebook-users2010-02.
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its operations by permitting membership internationally and made its
47
website available in several languages. Although it no longer maintains the number one spot, MySpace remains one of the most popu48
lar websites in the nation.
2.

Facebook

Shortly following MySpace, Facebook launched its site in 2004
49
from a Harvard dorm room. Although originally restricted to users
with a valid university or college “.edu” email address, the site even50
tually allowed access to users with any valid email address. Similar to
MySpace, joining Facebook requires that an individual provide an
51
email address, name, gender, and date of birth. Thereafter, the user is prompted to enter optional information, such as high school
52
name and graduation year, as well as post a profile picture. After
joining, members can connect with other members through “friending,” posting pictures, updating statuses, creating or joining groups
and events, and sending messages to other users. Like MySpace, Facebook also attempts to stop illegal activity from occurring on its site
by posting conditions of use that are applicable to all users. Facebook’s Statement of Rights and Responsibilities states:
Facebook users provide their real names and information, and we
need your help to keep it that way. Here are some commitments
you make to us relating to registering and maintaining the security of your account: You will not provide any false personal information on Facebook, or create an account for anyone other than
53
yourself without permission . . . .

As of July 2011, Facebook has grown to over 750 million users
54
worldwide. Facebook members, like those of MySpace, vary in age,
but the most common members are between the ages of eighteen
47
See
International–MySpace.com,
MYSPACE,
http://www.myspace.com/international (last visited Aug. 14, 2011).
48
See supra notes 33–36 and accompanying text.
49
#158 Mark Zuckerberg: The Forbes 400 Richest Americans 2009, FORBES.COM (Sept.
30,
2009),
http://www.forbes.com/lists/2009/54/rich-list-09_MarkZuckerberg_I9UB.html.
50
Timeline, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?timeline (last
visited Aug. 14, 2011).
51
FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/ (last visited Aug. 14, 2011).
52
Id.
53
Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/
terms.php?ref=p (last visited Aug. 14, 2011).
54
Statistics,
FACEBOOK,
http://www.facebook.com/facebook?ref=pf#/press/info.php?statistics (last visited
Aug. 14 2011).
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55

and twenty-one. On June 15, 2009, Facebook surpassed MySpace in
the number of members, both in the United States and worldwide, at
56
a rapid-fire pace.
B. Identity Theft: A Growing Problem
Although identity theft is a well-established crime, it is currently
57
the “fastest-growing crime” in the nation.”
The Federal Trade
Commission estimates that as many as nine million individuals fall
58
victim to identity theft each year. According to federal law, identity
theft is the knowing transfer, possession, or use of another’s means of
59
identification without authority. One’s “means of identification” is
defined as “any name or number that may be used, alone or in conjunction with any other information, to identify a specific individu60
al.”
Identity thieves target people of all demographics, races, genders, and nationalities. Identity thieves get an individual’s private information in a variety of ways—from “basic street theft to sophisti61
cated, organized crime schemes.” The most common methods that
identity thieves use to obtain another’s information are: “dumpster
diving,” when thieves look through trash for papers with personal information listed; “skimming,” when thieves use a special storage device to steal credit-card numbers when individuals make a purchase;
and “phishing,” when thieves send pop-ups or spam to lure people to
62
give personal information. Once an identity thief has a victim’s information in his or her hands, the thief can transact business as the
55

Dickman, supra note 46.
Erick Schonfeld, Facebook Finally Catches up to MySpace in the U.S., TECHCRUNCH
(June 15, 2009), http://www.techcrunch.com/2009/06/15/facebook-finally-catchesup-to-myspace-in-the-us/.
57
Identity
Theft,
U.
S.
POSTAL
INSPECTION
SERV.,
https://postalinspectors.uspis.gov/investigations/MailFraud/fraudschemes/mailthe
ft/IdentityTheft.aspx (last visited Aug. 14, 2011); accord Consumer Resources, IDENTITY
THEFT RECOURSE CENTER, http://www.idtheftcenter.org/c_resources/c_intro.shtml
(last visited Aug. 14, 2011).
58
About
Identity
Theft,
FED.
TRADE
COMM’N,
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/microsites/idtheft/consumers/about-identitytheft.html (last visited Aug. 14, 2011).
59
18 U.S.C. § 1028 (2006); see also 16 C.F.R § 603.2(a) (2004).
60
§ 1028(d)(7).
61
S. REP. NO. 105-274, at 6 (1998).
62
Take Charge: Fighting Back Against Identity Theft, FED. TRADE COMM’N,
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/idtheft/idt04.shtm (last visited Aug.
14, 2011). Identity thieves also use a change of address form to divert billing statements to the thieves themselves and listen for personal information shared during a
cell phone conversation. Id.
56
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victim and sometimes become the victim by living and working under
63
the victim’s name. An identity thief can take funds from an individual’s bank accounts, incur debts, and even commit crimes in anoth64
er’s name.
Identity thieves use different forms of identity theft to jeopardize
65
For example,
an individual’s personal or financial information.
identity theft occurs when, upon arrest, an identity thief “poses” as
another by providing law enforcement with another’s personal identi66
fying information. Financial fraud identity theft occurs when an
identity thief uses another’s identifying information for financial
gain, either by opening new accounts in the victim’s name or by tak67
ing over the victim’s already existing accounts. A third form, “identity cloning” or imposter fraud, occurs when an identity thief assumes
68
another’s identity by living and working as the victim.
Imposter fraud on social networking sites has recently become
69
popular among identity thieves. This form of imposter fraud occurs
when someone uses another’s information to create a profile or web70
page on a social networking site. Most professionals have enough
personal information in the public domain that an identity thief can
easily create an accurate and deceiving “online persona” on a social
71
networking site. Once an imposter has created this profile, he or
she can act as the victim in the virtual setting by communicating with
friends, acquaintances, and colleagues of the victim, which provides a
limitless opportunity for damage. An imposter can create difficulties
in employment, ruin professional and personal relationships, and
damage reputations, as well as steal corporate or financial records
72
and other sensitive information.
63

Om Paramapoonya, 10 Things Identity Theft Victims Must Do, HUB PAGES,
http://hubpages.com/hub/identity-theft-solutions (last visited Aug. 14, 2011).
64
Id.
65
Identity Theft (October 2009), NAT’L WHITE COLLAR CRIME CTR.,
http://www.nw3c.org (Follow “Research” then “Papers, Publications, Reports” then
“Papers”) (on file with author).
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
See ATTACK INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH CTR., ANNUAL THREAT REPORT: 2008
OVERVIEW
AND
2009
PREDICTIONS
13
(2008),
available
at
www.hasp.com/pdf/airc/AIRC-Annual-Threat-Report2008.pdf.
70
See id.
71
Id. (“In several experiments performed at the [Attack Intelligence Research
Center], as well as other facilities, a simulated fake online persona ended up connecting to the real network of acquaintances rather easily.”).
72
Id.
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Identity theft in any form takes an incredible toll on its victims.
With the potential to ruin a victim’s credit and financial history, taint
his or her criminal record, and destroy his or her reputation, identity
73
theft is a common fear among Americans. In addition, victims dedi74
cate large amounts of time to clearing their names. Although it has
been around for many years, identity theft has increased with the introduction of the Internet. Today, the information needed to steal
someone’s identity is likely just a few clicks away.
C. Regulation for Social Networking Sites: The Communications
Decency Act
Title V of the Telecommunications Act, also known as the
76
CDA, regulates offensive material on the Internet. Section 230 of
the CDA states, “No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information
77
provided by another information content provider.” Courts interpret this statute to provide a broad immunity, which encompasses
78
MySpace and similar social networking websites. The CDA also provides a “Good Samaritan” provision that limits the liability of those
providers or users who take action or provide the technical means to
79
restrict access to material that the providers consider obscene.
Congress enacted § 230 in response to Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v.
80
Prodigy Services Co. In Stratton, the New York Supreme Court for Nas75

73

Saad, supra note 17.
Fighting Identity Theft—The Role of FCRA: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin.
Insts. & Consumer Credit of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 15 (2002) (statement of Daniel L. Mihalko, Inspector in Charge, Cong. and Pub. Affairs, U.S. Postal
Inspection Service) (“It generally takes about 44 months to clear up their cases, and
victims report that they spend on average 175 hours actively trying to restore their
credit rating and to clear their good name.”); see also IDENTITY THEFT RES. CTR.,
IDENTITY
THEFT:
THE
AFTERMATH
2008
3
(2009),
available
at
http://www.idtheftcenter.org/artman2/uploads/1/Aftermath_2008_20090520.pdf
(noting that when an imposter opened a new account, victims spent approximately
165 hours clearing their names).
75
Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
47 U.S.C. (1996)).
76
See Ken S. Meyers, Wikimmunity: Fitting the Communications Decency Act to Wikipedia, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 163, 172 (2006).
77
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2006). “The term ‘interactive computer service’ means
any information service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables
computer access by multiple users to a computer server . . . .” § 230(f)(2).
78
See Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 843, 846 (W.D. Tex. 2007).
79
§ 230(c)(2).
80
No. 31063/94, 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995); see
H.R. REP. NO. 104-458, at 194 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10.
74
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sau County held that the interactive computer service provider Prodigy was liable for defamatory statements on its website because its ability to delete offensive material demonstrated its control, which the
court found rose to a level similar to that of a publisher over the con81
tent of the website. In enacting § 230, Congress disapproved of the
Stratton decision:
[Section 230] provides “Good Samaritan” protections from civil
liability for providers . . . of an interactive computer service for actions to restrict . . . access to objectionable online material. One
of the specific purposes of this section is to overrule StrattonOakmont v. Prodigy and any other similar decisions which have
treated such providers . . . as publishers or speakers of content
that is not their own because they have restricted access to objec82
tionable material.

The § 230 immunity aims “to keep government interference in
83
the medium to a minimum.” Representatives Christopher Cox and
Ron Wyden, who proposed § 230, wanted to limit the role of the Federal Communications Commission in regulating material on the Internet and instead, using filtering software, place the burden on par84
ents to regulate their children’s Internet activity. The CDA lists sevseveral policy goals of the immunity provision:
1) to promote the continued development of the Internet and
other interactive computer services and other interactive media;
2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation;
3) to encourage the development of technologies which maximize user control over what information is received by individuals,
families, and schools who use the Internet and other interactive
computer services;
4) to remove disincentives for the development and utilization of
blocking and filtering technologies that empower parents to restrict their children’s access to objectionable or inappropriate online material; and
5) to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal laws to deter and punish trafficking in obscenity, stalking, and harassment
85
by means of computer.

81

Stratton, 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229, at *13–14.
H.R. REP. NO. 104-458, at 194.
83
Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997).
84
See generally 141 CONG. REC. H8460–70 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (Statements of
Rep. Cox and Rep. Wyden).
85
47 U.S.C. § 230(b) (2006).
82
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The CDA expressly allows states to enact legislation consistent
with the CDA; however, states cannot create a cause of action that
would be inconsistent with the Act, such as holding an interactive
computer service provider or user liable as the publisher of informa86
tion produced by another information content provider.
Much of the litigation that has involved social networking sites
has focused on the CDA-immunity issue. The past disputes that
raised the CDA-immunity issue arose in the context of defamation
and other negligence claims as well as suits involving online sexual
predators. For example, in Zeran v. America Online, Inc., anonymous
postings of offensive advertisements, which contained the plaintiff’s
contact information, caused the plaintiff to receive death threats and
87
other harassing phone calls. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit, addressing whether America Online could be held liable for failing to remove advertisements after being notified of their
fraudulent nature, held that the CDA, “[b]y its plain language, . . .
creates a federal immunity to any cause of action that would make
service providers liable for information originating with a third-party
88
user of the service.” The court also noted that imposing liability in
such a situation would force website operators to screen every posting
on their websites and thoroughly investigate every complaint of de89
famation—an impossible burden.
Almost ten years later, in Doe v. MySpace, the U.S. District Court
for the Western District of Texas extended the immunity to social
90
networking sites. Thirteen-year-old Julie Doe was sexually assaulted
91
by a nineteen-year-old male whom she met through MySpace. The
court rejected the plaintiff’s argument for a narrow interpretation of
§ 230 immunity and thus excluded her claim of negligent failure to
implement basic safety measures to prevent sexual predators from
92
communicating with minors. The plaintiff argued that her claim
fell outside the scope of § 230 because she did not base her claim on
third-party content and did not direct her claim at the site in its ca93
pacity as an editor or publisher. The court noted several cases in
which courts granted § 230 immunity for claims of negligence and
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93

§ 230(e)(3).
129 F.3d 327, 329 (4th Cir. 1997).
Id. at 330.
Id. at 331, 333.
474 F. Supp. 2d 843, 846, 849–50 (W.D. Tex. 2007).
Id. at 846.
Id. at 848–50.
Id. at 848.
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declined to restrict the immunity to claims involving defamation or
94
actions involving the content of the information on the website.
Recently, however, courts have reconsidered past interpretations
of the CDA that gave Internet service providers (ISPs) blanket im95
munity from all civil-liability claims. For example, although ultimately finding that Craigslist was not liable for information posted by
a third party, in Chicago Lawyers’ Committee v. Craigslist, the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reinterpreted § 230 immunity:
“Subsection (c)(1) does not mention ‘immunity’ or any synonym. . . .
[Section] 230(c) as a whole cannot be understood as a general prohibition of civil liability for web-site operators and other online con96
tent hosts.” Quoting an earlier opinion to explain its holding, the
court questioned, “Why should a law designed to eliminate ISPs’ liability to the creators of offensive material end up defeating claims by
97
the victims of tortious or criminal conduct?”
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed that the
traditionally broad immunity should be construed more narrowly
than courts had in the past. In Fair Housing Council v. Roommates.com,
the court held that Roommates.com was not entitled to § 230 immunity because it became an information content provider through its
98
standardized questionnaire. The court noted that Congress passed
§ 230 to allow ISPs the opportunity to engage in some editing of usergenerated content without the risk of becoming liable for the defa99
matory content they did not edit or delete.
The CDA “was not
100
meant to create a lawless no-man’s-land on the Internet.” A more
recent Ninth Circuit decision reaffirmed the Roommates.com reinterpretations by holding that the immunity provision applies only when
a provider or user of an interactive computer service is being treated

94

Id. at 849. The Doe court also considered the case under Texas common law
and determined that no legal duty existed to hold the social networking site liable
under a theory of common-law negligence. The court determined that requiring a
duty to confirm or determine the age of applicants would “stop MySpace’s business
in its tracks,” ultimately shutting down this method of communication. Id. at 851.
95
See, e.g., Fair Hous. Council v. Roomates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th
Cir. 2008); Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law v. Craigslist, Inc., 519
F.3d 666, 669 (7th Cir. 2008).
96
519 F.3d at 669.
97
Id. at 670 (quoting Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 659–60 (7th Cir 2003)).
98
521 F.3d at 1164.
99
Id. at 1163.
100
Id. at 1164.
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as the publisher or speaker of information provided by another user
101
of the site.
D. Regulations for Identity Theft
Because identity theft is an increasing problem in the United
States, state and federal legislatures have continually returned to the
drawing board to enact laws to cover all facets of the crime. Over the
years, legislatures have enacted statutes that range from laws establishing identity theft as a crime to those regulating privacy and data
collection in an attempt to prevent identity theft from occurring in
the first place. But as the times and technology keep progressing,
various methods of identity theft fall outside the reach and protection
of the law and thus provide little remedy or help to victims.
1.

Federal Regulations

Although federal laws have made great strides in combating
identity theft, the number of victims affected by the crime continues
102
to increase. In 1998, Congress established identity theft as a crime
103
through the Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act. The
Act imposes criminal penalties upon offenders, including fines and
104
up to fifteen years of imprisonment.
Although the unauthorized
use or transfer of identifying documents and credit cards was illegal
prior to 1998, the Act added a provision criminalizing the use or
105
transfer of identifying information.
By doing so, Congress recognized that criminals do not need documents to assume another’s
106
identity; they generally just need the information.
Congress later
enacted the Internet False Identification Prevention Act, which covers exclusively problems of identity theft stemming from the Inter107
net. The Act expanded 18 U.S.C. § 1028 to include as a crime the
108
use of the Internet to transfer fraudulent or counterfeit documents.
101

Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1100–01 (9th Cir. 2009).
2009
Identity
Theft
Statistics,
SPENDONLIFE,
http://www.spendonlife.com/guide/2009-identity-theft-statistics (last visited Aug. 14,
2011) (stating that between 2007 and 2008 the number of identity-theft victims increased twenty-two percent).
103
Pub. L. No. 105-318, 112 Stat. 3007 (codified as 18 U.S.C. § 1028 (2006)).
104
Id.; U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-02-766, IDENTITY THEFT: AWARENESS
AND
USE
OF
IDENTITY
THEFT
DATA
1
(2002),
available
at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02766.pdf.
105
U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 104, at 1.
106
18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(7); see U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 104.
107
Pub. L. No. 106-578, 114 Stat. 3075 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1028 (2006)).
108
See id.
102
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Congress also imposed an “affirmative and continuing obliga109
The
tion” on financial institutions to protect consumers’ privacy.
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act requires financial institutions to put appropriate standards in place to protect against threats to the security or
integrity of customer records and unauthorized access or use of cus110
tomer records and information.
In addition, Congress enacted the Federal Credit Reporting
111
Act “to “promote efficiency in the Nation’s banking system and to
112
protect consumer privacy.”
The Act requires that credit-reporting
agencies create reasonable procedures to assure the accuracy of the
information contained in consumer credit reports and limit the avail113
ability of these reports.
The Federal Fair and Accurate Credit
Transactions Act of 2003 (FFACT), which amended the Federal Credit Reporting Act, focuses primarily on consumer reporting agencies
114
and the use of credit reports and credit scores.
FFACT addresses
additional issues, such as the procedures a business must set up for
consumer claims of identity theft, the ability to sell or transfer debt
involving identity theft, what may be printed on a credit- or debit-card
115
receipt, and the credit- or debit-card change-of-address process.
Despite Congress’s continued efforts to enact legislation combating
identity theft, the problem still prevails.
2.

State Regulations

In addition to the federal legislation enacted, most states have
116
These statutes,
enacted their own statutes involving identity theft.
109

Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6801 (2006)).
Id.
111
Pub. L. No. 91-508, § 602, 84 Stat. 1127 (1970) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681x (2006)).
112
TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 23 (2001) (citing § 1681(a)(2006)).
113
Id.; § 1681(b) (“It is the purpose of this subchapter to require that consumer
reporting agencies adopt reasonable procedures for meeting the needs of commerce
for consumer credit, personnel, insurance, and other information in a manner which
is fair and equitable to the consumer, with regard to the confidentiality, accuracy,
relevancy, and proper utilization of such information.”); see also id. § 1681b (Permissible Purposes of Consumer Reports); id. § 1681c (Requirements Relating to Information Contained in Consumer Reports).
114
Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117 Stat. 1952 (2003)(amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–
1681x); see also Holly K. Towle, Identity Theft: Myths, Methods, and New Law, 30
RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 237, 269–71 (2004).
115
§§ 1681–1681x ; see also Towle, supra note 114.
116
See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 13A-8-190–13A-8-201 (LEXIS through 2010 acts); ALASKA
STAT. § 11.46.565 (LEXIS through 2009 1st Session); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2008
(LEXIS through the forty-ninth legislature); CAL. PENAL CODE § 530.5-530.8 (LEXIS
through 2009–10 Extraordinary Sess.); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-9-120–16-9-132 (LEXIS
110
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however, do little more than declare identity theft a crime and outline the punishment. While the language of each state’s statutes varies, all state statutes attempt to criminalize the transfer or use of
117
another’s personal identifying information.
States create different
degrees or classes of crime and base such distinctions on a number of
factors, including how much information the identity thief pos118
119
sessed, the benefit received or value of the goods received, and
120
who the victim was.
Although most statutes punish only the identity thief, some state
statutes impose liability on third parties. For example, a Washington
statute imposes a duty on anyone who was involved in the fraudulent
transaction to provide all transactional information to the victim
121
upon a written request.
In doing so, the Washington Legislature
places financial institutions at risk for liability in the event of imposter
fraud. With the exception of Washington’s statute, however, state
regulations on identity theft fail to do more than simply criminalize
the act.
E. Lack of Legal Redress Available to Victims of Imposter Fraud on
Social Networking Sites
Over the years social networking sites have developed from an
innocent, fun method of socializing into today’s primary mode of
122
communication for both personal and professional matters.
This
through 2009 Sess.); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:21-17 (West 2009); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§
190.77–190.84 (West, Westlaw through 2009 legislation); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §
32.51 (LEXIS through 2009 1st Called Sess.); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.35.020
(West, Westlaw through 2009 legislation).
117
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-8-192 ( LEXIS through 2010 acts) (“A person commits the crime of identity theft if, without the authorization, consent, or permission
of the victim . . . he or she . . . [o]btains, records, or accesses identifying information
. . . .”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:21-17 (West 2009) (“A person is guilty of an offense if the
person . . . [o]btains any personal identifying information pertaining to another person and uses that information, or assists another person in using the information . . .
.”); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.35.020 (West, Westlaw through 2009) (“No person may
knowingly obtain, possess, use, or transfer a means of identification or financial information of another person . . . .”).
118
See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-5-903 (LEXIS through 2009 Sess.) (varying the
classes for criminal possession of a financial device based on how many devices the
thief has).
119
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-129b–c (LEXIS through 2008 Feb. Sess.) (imposing a Class B felony if the value of the benefit exceeds $10,000 and a Class C felony if the value of the benefit exceeds $5,000).
120
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-37-227 (LEXIS through 2009 Sess.) (heightening
the penalty if the victim is “an elder person or disabled person”).
121
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.35.040(1) (West, Westlaw through 2009).
122
ATTACK INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH CTR., supra note 69.
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expansion, however, has not been all fun and games. Although the
social networking sites are constantly trying to improve their security
protections to avoid spammers and hijackers from gaining access,
these sites currently operate with limited regulations and legal conse123
quences.
The majority of social networking sites, including Facebook and MySpace, have no system in place to verify that users are
124
who they say they are. In turn, social networking sites provide iden125
tity thieves with limitless opportunities to perpetrate identity crimes.
Under the Federal Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence
Act and various state identity-theft laws, victims of imposter fraud on
social networking sites are able to seek redress by directly pursuing
126
criminal and civil penalties against their imposters.
This option,
however, is not always available because, before filing a claim, a plaintiff would need to track down the imposter’s true identity through
the maze of the virtual world, which allows imposters to hide behind
127
IP addresses and pseudonyms. Moreover, even if the victim discovers the impostor’s identity, he or she might still have a difficult time
recovering damages if the imposter is insolvent. In addition, it is
possible that if the court considers the fraudulent profile a mere pa128
rody, there may be no legal remedy available.
Apart from the state and federal legislation imposing criminal or
civil penalties on identity theft, the current identity-theft legislation is
outside the scope of most, if not all, claims of imposter fraud on social networking sites. Although state and federal legislatures have
begun enacting laws to combat the prevalence of identity theft, these
statutes primarily focus on identity theft in the context of credit or fi-

123

See, e.g., Privacy, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/policy.php?ref=pf (last
visited Aug. 14, 2011); see supra Part II.C.
124
Wood, supra note 18; see also ALADDIN KNOWLEDGE SYSTEMS, supra note 69 (describing the potential for an “online nightmare . . . unless a more reliable, trustworthy model of easily connecting an online persona to a true person catches up with
social networking sites”).
125
ATTACK INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH CTR., supra note 69.
126
See supra notes 103–15 and accompanying text (detailing the federal law criminalizing identity theft); see also supra notes 116–21 and accompanying text (detailing
state laws criminalizing identity theft).
127
See Evan Brown, Maryland Court of Appeals Addresses Important Question of Internet
CASES
BLOG
(Mar.
8,
2009),
Anonymity,
INTERNET
http://blog.internetcases.com/2009/03/08/maryland-court-of-appeals-addressesimportant-question-of-internet-anonymity/ (discussing the varying standards jurisdictions use in determining whether to grant a subpoena for the operating service to
reveal the identity of the poster).
128
Wood, supra note 18.
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129

nancial fraud. The Federal Credit Reporting Act and FFACT, for
example, establish standards for credit reporting and the dissemination of an individual’s private information, which is useless to a victim
130
of imposter fraud on social networking sites. Unlike financial institutions and credit-reporting agencies, social networking sites are not
subject to any federal or state regulations; thus, they have free reign
over how or whether they should monitor and regulate their sites.
Victims of imposter fraud on social networking sites should be able to
seek redress from the people or institutions that made the crime
possible in the first place. Requiring these individuals to directly pursue the perpetrator after the fact does not get at the heart of the
problem—preventing imposter fraud from occurring in the first
place.
III. NEGLIGENT ENABLEMENT OF IMPOSTER FRAUD:
A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF IMPOSTER FRAUD ON SOCIAL
NETWORKING SITES
The common-law tort of negligent enablement of imposter
fraud is the most relevant legal mechanism available to victims of imposter fraud, absent action by either state legislatures or Congress
that imposes regulations on social networking sites. Although courts
generally disfavor this cause of action in the realm of identity theft
131
through financial institutions, courts have yet to examine the tort in
the context of imposter fraud on social networking sites. Negligent
enablement of imposter fraud could be the saving grace for victims of
imposter fraud because it provides victims with legal redress and
forces social networking sites to prevent identity theft on their websites in the first place.
A. Common-Law Tort of Negligent Enablement of Imposter Fraud
Plaintiffs largely use the common-law cause of action of negligent enablement of imposter fraud when a financial institution’s negligence assists or furthers an imposter’s effort to steal their identi132
ties.
Plaintiffs generally use the tort to hold a financial institution

129
See supra Part II.D (discussing the current regulations in the field of identity
theft).
130
See supra notes 111–15 and accompanying text.
131
See infra Part III.A.
132
See, e.g., Patrick v. Union State Bank, 681 So. 2d 1364, 1365–66 (Ala. 1996) (detailing how a bank’s failure to verify the identity of an individual opening an account
resulted in an imposter incurring $1,500 worth of debt in the plaintiff’s name, which
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liable for identity theft that occurred at or with the help of the insti133
tution. Although the financial institution was not the actual identi134
ty thief, its negligence allowed the identity theft to occur.
Victims
bring claims of negligent enablement of imposter fraud because
identity-theft victims have difficulty receiving compensation for their
135
injuries from their actual imposters.
To establish a claim for negligent enablement of imposter fraud,
a plaintiff must, as in all negligence claims, prove duty, breach, causa136
tion, and injury. In the context of financial institutions, a plaintiff
must show that the financial institution had a duty to protect the
plaintiff from identity theft. Then, the plaintiff must show that the
defendant negligently enabled the identity theft, thereby breaching
the duty owed to the plaintiff and causing damages. Courts and scholars, however, have heavily debated whether a duty exists to prevent
137
imposter fraud or identity theft from occurring to a third party.
Courts throughout the nation have given mixed reviews to negligent enablement of imposter fraud, with some recognizing the
cause of action and others refusing to recognize the tort or placing
limits on its application. For example, the Supreme Court of Alabama upheld a claim of negligent enablement of imposter fraud in
138
Patrick v. Union State Bank.
The court discussed the key factors in
determining whether a duty existed—foreseeability, the nature of the
defendant’s activity, the relationship between the parties, and the po139
tential injury or harm.
After considering these factors, the court
140
held that banks do in fact have a duty to the public-at-large. A special relationship existed because of “the importance of, and the pub141
lic trust placed in, the banking industry.”
The court further held
that a special relationship existed because the injury was foreseeable
ultimately resulted in the plaintiff’s arrest and incarceration for ten consecutive
days).
133
See e.g., id. at 1366–67.
134
See id. at 1367.
135
Anthony E. White, Comment, The Recognition of a Negligence Cause of Action for
Victims of Identity Theft: Someone Stole My Identity, Now Who’s Going to Pay for It?, 88
MARQ. L. REV. 847, 848 (2005).
136
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328A (1979).
137
See, e.g., Patrick, 681 So. 2d at 1367–68; Piscitelli v. Classic Residence by Hyatt,
973 A.2d 948, 963 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009); Huggins v. Citibank, N.A., 585
S.E.2d. 275, 277 (S.C. 2003).
138
Patrick, 681 So.2d at 1371–72. The court never explicitly referred to the cause
of action as negligent enablement of imposter fraud. See generally id.
139
Id. at 1368–69.
140
Id. at 1369.
141
Id.
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and the bank was in the best position to prevent the harm from oc142
curring.
Subsequent treatment of the holding in Patrick, however,
is less favorable to recognizing negligent enablement of imposter
fraud as a remedy to victims of imposter fraud at financial institutions. Alabama courts have distinguished, limited, and criticized the
143
Patrick holding, and courts outside of Alabama have severely limited
144
or rejected it.
Like the Alabama court, the South Carolina Court of Appeals also held a financial institution liable to a third party for failing to fol145
146
low the procedures. This failure led to the victim’s stolen identity.
The court held that the bank owed a duty of care to the victim of the
identity theft when the victim asked the bank to close the fraudulent147
ly opened accounts. The South Carolina Supreme Court, however,
later held that South Carolina would not recognize negligent
148
enablement of imposter fraud.
Several state courts expressly refuse to recognize the tort of negligent enablement of imposter fraud. These courts rely on two cases
that held that financial institutions have no relationship with, and
149
therefore no duty to, victims of imposter fraud.
In Polzer v. TRW,
Inc., the New York Intermediate Appellate Court held that New York
does not recognize a cause of action for negligent enablement of im-

142

Id. at 1369, 1371.
See, e.g., Flying J Fish Farm v. Peoples Bank of Greensboro, 12 So. 3d 1185,
1194–95 (Ala. 2008) (distinguishing Patrick on the fact that the bank was not in the
best position to prevent the harm and that the bank intended that the loan-approval
policies would protect the bank, not the customer); Smith v. AmSouth Bank, Inc.,
892 So. 2d 905, 911 (Ala. 2004) (explaining that although the result may have been
the same, the “inquiry in Patrick was not properly focused”).
144
See, e.g., Eisenberg v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 301 F.3d 220, 226 (4th Cir. 2002)
(citing Patrick as authority contrary to its decision); Guerra v. Regions Bank, 188
S.W.3d 744, 748 (Tex. App. 2006) (refusing to follow Patrick); Nicholl v. Nationsbank
of Ga., N.A., 488 S.E.2d 751, 753 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) (limiting Patrick to its facts).
145
Murray v. Bank of Am., 580 S.E.2d 194, 198 (S.C. Ct. App. 2003)
146
Id. at 196–97.
147
Id. at 198.
148
See infra note 152 and accompanying text.
149
See, e.g., Fargis v. Am. Express Travel Related Servs., No. 1:07-1507-MBS, 2009
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2398 (D.S.C. Jan. 12, 2009) (holding, a similar position to Huggins,
that a special relationship that gave rise to a legal duty did not exist between plaintiff
and AmEx); Smith v. Citibank, N.A., No. 00-0587-CV-W-1-ECF, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
25047 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 3, 2001) (holding a, similar position to Polzer, that financial
institutions do not have a duty to non-customers because a special relationship does
not exist).
143
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150

poster fraud. The court further held that the plaintiffs and the financial institutions do not have a special relationship that gives rise
151
to a traditional claim of negligence. The South Carolina Supreme
Court, ignoring the previous appellate decision which held to the
contrary, joined New York’s rejection of the negligent enablement of
152
imposter fraud claim in Huggins v. Citibank. The court held that issuers of credit cards do not have a legal duty to victims of identity
153
theft because the relationship is too attenuated. The court opined
that, although the harm is foreseeable, foreseeability alone is not
154
enough to give rise to a duty. The court noted that victims of credit
card fraud have remedies available through current state and federal
legislation, and although these remedies may not always fully compensate victims of identity theft, the legislature is better equipped to
155
handle this area.
A 2007 opinion from the District of Tennessee, however, criticized Huggins and held that a bank has a duty to verify the authentici156
ty and accuracy of a credit account application.
The court found
that the Huggins court’s reliance on the absence of a prior business
157
relationship between the victim and the bank was flawed. The determination of whether a duty exists should involve an “examin[ation] [of] all relevant circumstances with an emphasis on the
158
foreseeability of the alleged harm.”
In addition to recognizing the tort of negligent enablement of
imposter fraud against financial institutions, the New Jersey Appellate
Division recently discussed the tort in the employment context. The
court addressed whether employers are liable for failing to verify the
159
identity of prospective employees. In Piscitelli v. Classic Residence by
Hyatt, an immigrant woman used the plaintiff’s name and social security number, which she purchased for $800 from an unidentified per-

150

256 A.D.2d 248, 249 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997). The court does not explain its reasoning for not recognizing this cause of action. See id.
151
Id.
152
585 S.E.2d 275, 276 (S.C. 2003).
153
Id. at 277.
154
Id.
155
Id. at 277–78
156
Wolfe v. MBNA Am. Bank, 485 F. Supp. 2d 874, 881–82 (W.D. Tenn. 2007).
157
Id.
158
Id. at 882. The court held that a duty exists because the idea that harm will result from the negligent issuance of a credit card is foreseeable. Id.
159
See Piscitelli v. Classic Residence by Hyatt, 973 A.2d 948, 959 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2009).
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son, to obtain employment as a maid with the defendant.
The
plaintiff sought to hold the defendant liable for negligently enabling
161
the imposter to become lawfully employed using her information.
Although the appellate division recognized that identity theft and
harm to an unrelated third-party was reasonably foreseeable when
employers fail to verify the identity of their prospective employees,
the court nonetheless held that an employer does not have a duty to
162
third parties to verify a prospective employee’s identity. Taking into consideration questions of fairness and policy, the court determined that the burden imposed on an employer would be too great
and the potential increase in the cost of hiring would be contrary to
163
the public’s interest.
Although the claim of negligent enablement of imposter fraud
has received less than favorable treatment from the courts in the context of financial institutions and employment, only a few states have
164
addressed the tort thus far. With the continued prevalence of identity theft and the lack of effective solutions, however, the claim of
negligent enablement of imposter fraud remains a possible avenue
for plaintiffs to seek redress.
B. The Communications Decency Act: A Traditional Bar to Claims
Against Social Networking Sites
To hold a social networking site liable for negligent enablement
of imposter fraud, a plaintiff must first establish that the CDA’s immunity provision does not defeat the claim. Unfortunately, most
courts have interpreted § 230 as providing social networking sites
with broad immunity insulating these sites from certain civil law165
suits. The case law, however, does not completely foreclose liability
for social networking sites for failure to implement reasonable security measures. More recently, courts have begun to recognize that the
Internet provides a mode of communication that no longer needs
this insulation to thrive, especially in light of the vast amount of harm
160

Id. at 951.
Id. at 962–63.
162
Id. at 967 (“[T]he ability to foresee an injury does not in itself establish the existence of a duty.”).
163
Id. The court also noted that adopting this new duty would “upset traditional
concepts and basic principles dealing with protection and remedies in the field of
identity theft” because the legislature has enacted a statute providing victims a remedy through the imposter. Id.
164
Kristin E. Solomon, Facing Identity Theft: New Victim’s Rights Act Imposes New Rules
to Protect You, 12 TENN. B.J. 12, 14 (2004).
165
See supra Part II.C (discussing cases interpreting § 230 as a broad immunity).
161
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facilitated by the Internet over the years.
In turn, courts have be167
gan to revisit and reinterpret the § 230 immunity provision.
1.

Plaintiffs May Sue Social Networking Sites for Negligent
Enablement of Imposter Fraud Regardless of the CDA
Because the § 230 Immunity Does Not Apply.

When interpreting legislation, courts look to the plain language
168
of the statute and the legislative history. Applying these principles
to § 230, it becomes evident that the Act meant to provide protection
for those interactive computer services that attempt to screen or
block offensive material, not to provide a blanket immunity to those
who fail to do anything to screen material.
Congress enacted the § 230 immunity provision as part of Title V
of the Telecommunications Act, which is entitled “Obscenity and Vi169
olence.” Section 230’s title is “Protection for private blocking and
screening of offensive material” and § 230(c)’s title is “Protection for
170
‘Good Samaritan’ blocking and screening of offensive material.” In
Doe v. GTE Corp., Judge Easterbrook noted that the title is “hardly an
apt description if its principle effect is to induce ISPs to do nothing
about the distribution of indecent and offensive materials via their
171
service.” Rather, one should read the text of the CDA in conjunc172
Thus, § 230(c)(1) becomes a “definitional
tion with the title.
clause” defining those entities that are eligible for immunity under §
230(c)(2)—those interactive computer services that take action to

166
See, e.g., Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d 1157, 1163 n.15 (9th
Cir. 2008) (“[T]he internet is no longer a fragile new means of communication that
could easily be smothered in the cradle by overzealous enforcement of laws and regulations . . . . And its vast reach into the lives of millions is exactly why we must be
careful not to exceed the scope of the immunity provided by Congress.”). But see,
Ryan Singel, FCC Approves Net Neutrality Rule, Now the Fight Begins, WIRED (Oct. 22,
2009, 1:29 PM), http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2009/10/fcc-net-neutrality/ (discussing the FCC’s recently proposed Net Neutrality Rules which will, in part, disallow
broadband internet providers to block legal content sent over the internet by users
and limit users’ ability to run lawful applications of their choice).
167
See supra Part II.C (discussing the recent shift in interpretation of § 230).
168
See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE ET AL., LEGISLATION, STATUTES AND THE
CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY (West Law School 2007).
169
Pub. L. No. 104, 110 Stat. 104 (1996) (codified at 47 U.S. § 230 (2006)). Title
V is also known as the Communications Decency Act. Id.
170
47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006).
171
347 F.3d 655, 659 (7th Cir. 2003). Judge Easterbrook’s analysis in GTE Corp.
was later adopted in Chicago Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, 519 F.3d 666, 669–70 (7th Cir. 2008).
172
GTE Corp., 347 F.3d at 659.
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173

block or screen offensive material. Under such an analysis, interactive service providers that take the “do nothing” approach cannot be
immune from all lawsuits against them.
Congress specifically enacted § 230 to overrule Stratton Oakmont,
174
Inc. v. Prodigy Service, Co., which held an interactive computer ser175
vice liable because of its editing and removal capabilities.
The Senate Conference Report further suggests the limitation of the immunity provision by providing that the purpose of the Good
Samaritan provisions is to protect interactive computer services from
civil liability “for actions to restrict . . . access to objectionable online
176
material.”
Social networking sites, by not attempting to prevent
identity theft, do not fall within in the Good Samaritan provision of §
230.
In addition, social networking sites may be deemed outside the
reach of the § 230 immunity provision for enabling identity theft because they are not treated as the publisher or speaker of information.
Examining multiple provisions of § 230, one court suggested a three177
pronged test to establish who qualifies for immunity. First, the website must be an “interactive service provider;” second, the cause of action must treat the website as a “publisher or speaker” of information;
and third, another “information content provider” must have pro178
vided the information. In arguing for application of the immunity
provision, the first prong—the requirement that the website be an interactive service provider—is easy for a social networking site to prove
because the case law explicitly places websites within the definition of
179
an interactive service provider. The third requirement for immunity is also easy to prove because the information at issue is not posted
by the social networking site itself. All of the information that a user
posts, including profile information, is provided by the user without
intermediary editing or screening by the social networking site. This
requirement, however, might not be met because the claim at issue in

173

Craigslist, 519 F.3d at 670.
S. REP. NO. 104-230, at 194 (1996) (“One of the specific purposes of this section is to overrule Stratton Oakmont . . . and any other similar decisions which have
treated such providers and users as publishers or speakers of content that is not their
own because they have restricted access to objectionable material.”).
175
No. 31063/94, 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 25, 1995).
176
S. REP. NO. 104-230, at 194.
177
Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1100 (9th Cir. 2009).
178
Id.
179
See Doe v. MySpace, 474 F. Supp. 2d 843, 846 (W.D. Tex. 2007).
174
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this Comment is about the procedures in place for registering, not
what the information content provider has posted about the user.
Social networking sites should not receive immunity because
they do not meet the second requirement for immunity. The causes
of action typically barred under § 230 are defamation and other similar claims related to the actual comments posted by another user of
180
the website.
Some plaintiffs have tried to mask their defamatory
statement claims as negligence claims; however, the courts have seen
through this “tactic” and, instead, have looked to the underlying facts
181
at issue. But, bringing a claim of negligent enablement of imposter
fraud is not a tactic to hide a claim about comments made on the site;
rather, it is an attempt to hold social networking sites liable for their
inadequate procedures. The claim does not relate to a social networking site’s capacity as a publisher or as a speaker of its users’ content, but rather, to the social networking site’s capacity as a provider
of the site in the first place. Therefore, § 230 immunity would not
cover a claim under a theory of negligent enablement of imposter
fraud.
Considering the legislative record for the § 230 amendment, the
immunity provision does not apply to claims such as negligent
enablement of imposter fraud. As a whole, the CDA immunity was a
mix of efforts to regulate material, specifically pornography, available
on the Internet, promote freedom of speech on the Internet, and al182
low ISPs to self-regulate without fear of “publisher liability.” While
Senator Exon was concerned about the availability of obscene con183
tent on the Internet and wanted to protect children and families,
Representatives Cox and Wyden wanted to put the pressure on par184
ents to use available filtering software to protect their children.
180

See, e.g., Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law v. Craigslist, Inc., 519
F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2008); Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
181
See, e.g., Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1101; Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d
1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 2003).
182
See 141 CONG. REC. H8470 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995); see also Robert Cannon, The
Legislative History of Senator Exon’s Communications Decency Act: Regulating Barbarians on
the Information Superhighway, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 51, 52–53 (1996); Emily K. Fritts, Internet Libel and the Communications Decency Act: How the Courts Erroneously Interpreted
Congressional Intent with Regard to Liability of Internet Service Providers, 93 KY. L.J. 765,
774–75 (2004).
183
141 CONG. REC. 18,046 (1994) (statement of Sen. Exon). In 1994, Senator Exon proposed an amendment to the CDA which would “update[] [the CDA]for the
digital world of the future.” Id. Senator Exon aimed “to protect children from being
exposed to obscene, lewd, or indecent messages.” Id.
184
141 CONG. REC. H8470 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Wyden)
(“[W]e believe that parents and families are better suited to guard the portals of cy-
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The emphasis on obscenity throughout the legislative history, in addition to the text of the Act itself, suggests that the immunity provision
would not extend to claims for inadequate procedures that facilitate
185
imposter fraud.
In addition, the § 230 immunity should be limited for policy reasons. Imposter fraud has the potential to be extremely harmful and
efforts to help combat this overwhelmingly prevalent crime would be
in accord with public policy. Furthermore, imposing liability on social networking sites does not frustrate the findings and policies at
186
the foundation of the CDA. Encouraging social networking sites to
have effective verification measures does not limit the ability of these
sites to be a “forum for true diversity of political discourse, . . . cultural development, and . . . intellectual activity,” or the ability of these
sites to be relied on; rather, it furthers these ideas by ensuring that
187
the speaker is who the speaker claims to be.
Allowing liability in
this situation also does not hinder the “continued development of the
Internet” or the preservation of the “vibrant and competitive free
market,” but rather it encourages it.
2.

In the Alternative, Congress Should Amend the CDA to
Permit Liability of Social Networking Sites for Enabling
Identity Theft

If courts are unwilling to read the CDA immunity provision to
exclude liability for failure to implement appropriate verification
measures, Congress should amend the CDA to limit the current law’s
blanket immunity. To hold social networking sites responsible for facilitating identity theft through their websites, Congress should
amend the current immunity provision to read, “No provider or user
of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or
speaker of any information provided by another information content
provider, except for the purposes of preventing identity theft.”
This proposed amendment would prevent a social networking
site from claiming § 230 immunity when the site’s ineffective prevenberspace and protect our children than our Government bureaucrats. Parents can
get relief now from the smut on the Internet by making a quick trip to the neighborhood computer store where they can purchase reasonably priced software that blocks
out the pornography on the Internet.”); see also Meyers, supra note 76, at 172.
185
See 141 CONG. REC. H8469–71 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995). Every Representative
that spoke on the proposed § 230 amendment discussed it in reference to the problem of child pornography. Id.
186
See supra notes 82–85 and accompanying text (listing the policy goals of the
CDA).
187
47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(3), (5) (2006).
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tative measures allow an imposter to create an account in another’s
name. By creating a specific exception to the current rule, this proposal would still protect social networking sites from liability for every
word, sentence, or picture posted on the site. Therefore, social networking sites would only be subject to liability if they neglect to maintain reasonable procedures to prevent imposter fraud.
The CDA presents a hurdle to a plaintiff seeking redress against
social networking sites because courts have often granted these websites blanket immunity against lawsuits resulting from information
posted on their website. In doing so, courts effectively established the
Internet as a place where anything goes. In recent years, courts have
reinterpreted the immunity provision more narrowly, which gives
hope to plaintiffs who seek redress for imposter fraud on social networking sites. In the alternative, Congress should explicitly amend
the provision to allow for such liability. The expansive growth and
advancement of the Internet calls for the courts and Congress to take
a second look at the protections that they provided when the Internet
initially began.
C. Applying the Cause of Action of Negligent Enablement of Imposter
Fraud to Social Networking Sites
The tort of negligent enablement of imposter fraud, although
novel, remains a viable cause of action for victims of imposter fraud
188
on social networking sites. In establishing the tort of spoliation, the
California Court of Appeal, in Smith v. Superior Court, quoted Prosser
and Keeton:
New and nameless torts are being recognized constantly, and the
progress of the common law is marked by many cases of first impression, in which the court has struck out boldly to create a new
cause of action, where none has been recognized before . . . . The
law of torts is anything but static, and the limits of its development

188
The tort of spoliation holds an individual who “intentionally destroys, mutilates, or alters evidence, and thereby interferes with a person’s prospective or actual
civil action against either the spoliator or a third person, [] liable in tort to that person.” Thomas G. Fischer, Annotation, Intentional Spoliation of Evidence, Interfering with
Prospective Civil Action, as Actionable, 70 A.L.R.4th 984, § 2. Although not every state
recognizes this independent tort, over the past 10 years or so several states, such as
Indiana and Ohio, do recognize spoliation as a tort claim. Id. The elements of the
tort can vary, but one court requires: (1) “pending or probable litigation involving
plaintiff,” (2) “knowledge on the part of defendant that litigation exists or is probable,” (3) “willful destruction of evidence by defendant designed to disrupt the plaintiff’s case,” (4) “disruption of plaintiff’s case,” and (5) “damages proximately caused
by the defendant’s acts.” Smith v. Howard Johnson Co., 615 N.E.2d 1037, 1038
(Ohio 1993).

STERRITT_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1724

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

11/7/2011 1:47 PM

[Vol. 41:1695

are never set. When it becomes clear that the plaintiff’s interests are entitled to legal protection against the conduct of the defendant, the mere
fact that the claim is novel will not of itself operate as a bar to re189
medy.

Victims of imposter fraud are undoubtedly entitled to protection
against the lack of action by the social networking sites. Expanding
the tort of negligent enablement of imposter fraud to cover social
networking sites would not only provide victims with a realistic remedy, but would also encourage social networking sites to increase security and regulating measures and ultimately decrease the instances of
imposter fraud.
The tort of negligent enablement of imposter fraud is similar to
the traditional tort of negligence. Negligent conduct is characterized
as that which “falls below the standard established by law for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm,” and the stan190
dard is “that of a reasonable man under like circumstances.” To establish a cause of action for negligent enablement of imposter fraud,
the plaintiff must show the following elements: (1) the defendant
owed a duty of care to the plaintiff to prevent or attempt the prevent
imposter fraud from occurring, (2) the defendant breached that duty
by failing to attempt to prevent imposter fraud from occurring, (3)
the defendant’s failure caused injury to the plaintiff, and (4) the
191
plaintiff suffered an injury for which a court can award damages.
The first and most difficult element to prove is the existence of a duty. The plaintiff must convince the court to impose a duty on social
networking sites to act reasonably when allowing users to register.
1.

Social Networking Sites Should Have a Duty to
Implement Reasonable Protections Against
Imposter Fraud

Social networking sites should have a duty to third parties to implement reasonable registration procedures protecting against imposter fraud. Defined, a duty is “an obligation, to which the law will
give recognition and effect, to conform to a particular standard of
192
conduct toward another.” The general rule is that no legal duty ex-

189

151 Cal. App. 3d 491, 495–96 (Ct. App. 1984) (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 1, at 3–4 (4th ed. (1971))).
190
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1965).
191
See id. § 281 (detailing the elements of a cause of action for negligence).
192
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 53 (W.
Page ed., 5th ed. 1984).
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193

ists to prevent harm to third parties. But, courts do impose a duty
on third parties in the presence of special circumstances or relationship. When determining whether a duty exists, courts often consider
questions of policy and fairness, including the type of injury or harm,
the foreseeability of the injury or harm, the relationship between the
194
parties, and other public policy and social considerations.
Although foreseeability does not establish a duty in itself, the
fact that the harm is foreseeable is a “crucial element” given signifi195
cant consideration.
Courts generally use foreseeability to limit a
tortfeasor’s liability; however, it has also been used to create a legal
196
duty. Interpreting Judge Cardozo’s language in Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad, William Prosser stated, “Negligence must be a matter of
some relation between the parties, some duty, which could be
founded only on foreseeability of some harm to the plaintiff in fact
197
injured.” Courts have adopted foreseeability as the central element
198
to establish a legal duty.
In the context of social networking sites, it is reasonably foreseeable that the relaxed “honor code” mechanisms in place for registration allow an individual to register for these sites as someone else,
which results in a myriad of potential harms. The absence of any
form of verification creates a limitless opportunity for fraud. To
create an account on a social networking site, an imposter simply
needs to create a fake email address to which the account will be
199
linked and enter a few basic personal facts.
Anyone who has the
slightest bit of personal information available on the Internet is only
a few clicks away from an imposter creating an account in his or her
193

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315(b) (1965).
See, e.g., Key v. Compass Bank, 826 So. 2d 159, 170 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001); Chi
Lap Yan v. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co., No. 1:03-CV-1980-SEB-JPG, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
33819, at *11 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 2, 2005) (holding that to determine the existence of a
duty, three factors are balanced: (1) the relationship between the parties, (2) the
reasonable foreseeability of harm to the person injured, and (3) public concerns);
Piscitelli v. Classic Residence by Hyatt, 973 A.2d 948, 966 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2009).
195
Piscitelli, 973 A.2d at 966 (citing Carter Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. EMAR Grp.,
Inc., 638 A.2d 1288, 1294 (N.J. 1994)).
196
Steffen Nolte, The Spoliation Tort: An Approach to Underlying Principles, 26 ST.
MARY’S L.J. 351, 376 (1994).
197
William L. Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1, 5 (1953). Judge Cardozo first referenced foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff in the context of duty in
Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad, 162 N.E. 99, 101 (N.Y. 1928).
198
Nolte, supra note 196 (listing several courts relying on foreseeability as the
primary element in determining duty).
199
See supra note 69–70 and accompanying text (discussing how imposters can easily generate a profile in someone else’s name).
194
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name. Although the harm from imposter fraud is highly foreseeable,
the inquiry as to whether a duty should be imposed does not stop
200
there.
Although a traditional relationship does not exist between a victim of imposter fraud and a social networking site, a special relationship nonetheless exists, which gives another reason for courts to impose a duty. The only connection between the parties is likely to be
through the imposter. One scholar, however, suggests that this is
enough: “Although the victimized individual is not a bank ‘customer’
in the traditional sense, the financial institution acts under the presumption that the named individual is the ‘customer’ when the im201
poster presents the named individual’s identifying information.”
Similarly, a social networking site operates as if the victim is a user or
a member until notified about the fraud. Therefore, the “third-party”
victim has a pseudo-relationship with the social networking site.
Imposing a duty is also appropriate because such a duty would
not be too burdensome on social networking sites. Although the
harm may be foreseeable, courts are not likely to impose a duty if the
202
imposition will be unfair, either physically or financially.
Verification technology currently exists and a few social networking sites,
such as eHarmony.com and Funky Sexy Cool, have started to offer ve203
rification as an option to its users. IDology and RelyID currently of-

200
Courts place varying emphasis on the foreseeability requirement. See, e.g., Patrick v. Union State Bank 681 So. 2d 1364, 1368 (Ala. 1995) (holding that the ability
to foresee the injury is the “key factor”); Carter Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. EMAR Grp.
Inc., 638 A.2d 1288, 1294 (N.J. 1994) (noting that foreseeability is a “crucial element” but not the only element); Huggins v, Citibank, 585 S.E.2d 275, 277 (S.C.
2003) (“[F]oreseeability alone does not give rise to a duty.”); Wolfe v. MBNA Am.
Bank, 485 F. Supp. 2d 874, 882 (W.D. Tenn. 2007) (“[A court] must examine all the
relevant circumstances with an emphasis on the foreseeability of the alleged harm.”).
201
Heather M. Howard, The Negligent Enablement of Imposter Fraud: A Common-Sense
Common Law Claim, 54 DUKE L.J. 1263, 1286–87 (2005). This approach is similar to
that taken by the court in Patrick. See Patrick, 681 So. 2d at 1369 (“The fact that the
relationship defies common categorization does not mean that there is no relationship.”).
202
See, e.g., Piscitelli v. Classic Residence by Hyatt, 973 A.2d 948, 967 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2009)
203
Zack Martin, Social Networking Sites Have Little to No Identity Verification, CR80
NEWS (Mar. 31, 2008), http://www.cr80news.com/2008/03/31/social-networkingsites-have-little-to-no-identity-verification; see also Trulioo Launches Internet ID Verification
System,
VILLAGE
GAMER
(Sept.
1,
2009),
http://www.villagegamer.net/2009/09/01/trulioo-launches-internet-id-verificationsystem [hereinafter Trulioo Launches].
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fer identification- and age-verification technology.
IDology’s software takes information provided by the consumer, such as name, year
of birth, and residence zip code, and searches through public data
205
records to verify the identity of the consumer.
IDology also offers
advanced software, which generates multiple choice questions from
the information provided, including questions about historical ad206
dresses, people the user knows, and cars the user has owned. Similarly, RelyID’s technology checks public record databases and comes
back with a multiple-choice quiz. Then, upon passing the quiz, the
207
user becomes verified. This technology is limited in the instance of
208
minors because they lack public data.
A solution to this problem,
however, could be to require a parent—verified through the public
record searching technology—to confirm that his or her child is who
209
the child claims to be. In addition, another available software verifies a person’s identity by asking questions to that person’s “friends”
210
or contacts on the social networking site.
A concern, however, is
211
that these verification systems can be costly. Although expensive at
the moment, the cost can likely be reduced as the demand for verification systems increases (because of the threat of potential liability).
In addition, social networking sites can deflect the cost of the system
to the users or advertisers.
Furthermore, courts should impose a duty on social networking
sites because such a duty is in the best interest of the public. Courts
look to a variety of public policy interests, such as who is in the best
position to prevent the harm, to determine if imposing a duty is im212
portant.
In this situation, social networking sites are the first and
the last line of defense against imposter fraud. Apart from preemp204
See
Solutions
for
ID
verification,
IDOLOGY,
http://www.idology.com/solutions/solutions (last visited Mar. 16, 2011); Products,
RELYID, http://www.relyid.com/products.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2011).
205
John Dancu, Using Identity and Age Verification within Social Networking Sites,
1
(July
21,
2008),
IDOLOGY
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/sites/cyber.law.harvard.edu/files/IDology_ISTTFTAB
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tively creating a profile on all social networking sites, individuals can
do very little to prevent imposter fraud. In addition, often a victim
does not realize that someone has been “posing” as him or her for
quite a while and by the time the victim discovers the fraud, the damage has already been done. Social networking sites, however, are in a
prime position to prevent imposters from having the opportunity to
commit this crime. The value of protecting individuals’ identity, especially when identity theft is on a rapid rise, is likely to trump any
public policy considerations to the contrary.
2.

The Social Networking Site’s Failure to Implement
Reasonable Registration Procedures Causes
Imposter Fraud

Social networking sites should be liable against victims of imposter fraud on their sites because their failure to reasonably regulate
how members register for the site causes imposter fraud to occur. In
proving the element of causation, a plaintiff will need to show that
the site’s breach of the duty to impose reasonable procedures pre213
venting imposter fraud caused the plaintiff’s injury.
Causation is
established if the defendant’s conduct was a “substantial factor in
214
bringing about the harm.”
To prevent extensive liability, an individual is not held liable for negligent conduct if the conduct was too
215
Generally, courts do not recognize
far removed from the injury.
causation when no one could reasonably foresee the injury.
In this context, a social networking site’s lack of appropriate
procedures for registration enables the imposter to create a false profile. As discussed above, website operators can reasonably foresee
that without a verification system or procedure in place, imposter
fraud could occur on the site. Thus, if reasonable procedures were in
place for registration on the social networking site, imposter fraud
216
would not occur.

213

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 430 (1965).
Id. § 431.
215
Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (N.Y. 1931) (limiting liability in
order to avoid creating “liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate
time to an indeterminate class”).
216
If an instance of imposter fraud by chance occurs despite the site’s procedures,
the site would not be liable if the procedures in place were reasonable.
214
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The Lack of Reasonable Procedures Harms Victims of
Imposter Fraud

A victim of imposter fraud on social networking sites suffers injury as a result of the site’s negligence. Although the specific injuries
vary between plaintiffs, victims of imposter fraud, just like victims of
traditional identity theft, have the potential to suffer a wide array of
217
harm.
Damages could stem from money and time spent clearing
218
one’s name to emotional distress from the incident.
The purpose
219
of damages is to “punish wrongdoers and deter wrongful conduct,”
and providing damages in this scenario unquestionably punishes social networking sites for their neglect and deters similar neglect in
the future.
IV. CONCLUSION
Identity theft has been an established crime for some time; however, it has recently become one of the fastest-growing crimes and
220
concerns among Americans. With this has come the development
of a new form of identity theft—imposter fraud on social networking
sites. Today, the information needed to assume another’s identity is
readily available on the Internet. Easy access to important information on the Internet, combined with the lack of verification procedures on social networking sites, creates limitless opportunities for
fraud.
Skilled identity thieves and innocent, computer-savvy
youngsters can pose as someone else on these websites to play a
harmless prank on friends, or even worse, to cause serious harms to
their victims.
Both Congress and state legislatures criminalized identity theft,
221
which resulted in either monetary fines or incarceration.
The
complexities of the Internet, however, make actually finding the perpetrator very difficult. Therefore, plaintiffs should be able to turn to
another source of the crime to obtain relief—the social networking
sites themselves. The CDA has traditionally insulated these sites from
liability for negligence-based claims such as defamation, but an analysis of more recent interpretations of the CDA suggests that courts are
re-thinking this blanket immunity. Given this recent change in direction, a court addressing a plaintiff’s claim against a social networking
217
218
219
220
221

See supra Part II.B.
See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901(c) (1965).
See supra Part II.B.
See supra Part II.D.
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site for enabling imposter fraud because of a failure to implement
reasonable registration procedures should read the CDA to allow
such a claim because the site would not be treated as the publisher or
speaker of the content. In the alternative, the legislature should
amend the CDA to allow for an exception for preventing imposter
fraud and identity theft.
Although met with skepticism in some courts, negligent enablement of imposter fraud is the most appropriate legal mechanism to
combat imposter fraud on social networking sites. A plaintiff attempting to use this tort will need to show that the social networking
site owed a duty to the public-at-large to implement reasonable registration procedures and, by failing to do so, caused injury or damages.
Expanding this tort to the context of social networking sites affords
victims of imposter fraud a method of relief and forces social networking sites to take proactive measures to prevent plaintiff imposter
fraud on their sites in the first place. The risk of liability will ultimately create a safer Internet without hindering its positive aspects.

